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In the

SUPREME COURT
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ST.ATE OF UTAH
1• the Matte1 of the Estate of
ANNA L. HARRIS, Deceased.

ZION 1S SAVINGS BANK AND
.TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,
Appellant

vs.
STERLING P. HARRIS, administrator of the estate of Anna
L. Harris, deceased,
Respondent.
APPELLANT'S ABSTRACT
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court,
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H-o norable P. C. Evans, Judge
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.
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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
ANNA L. HAR-RIS, Deceased.

ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,
Ap·pellant
vs.

Case No.
6238

STERLING P. HARRIS, administrator of the estate of Anna
L. Harris, deceased,
Respondent.
APPELLANT'S ABSTRACT
30

ORDER
On Stip.ulation in open Court by J. D. Skeen,
attorney for Sterling P. Harris, administrator
herein and H. P. Thomas, attorney for Zion's
Savings Bank & Trust Company and good cause
.
appearing,
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IT IS HEREBY ORD·ERED, that no application shall be made nor any order entered authorizing said administrator to revive or institute any
proceedings in bankruptcy or debtors relief without notice of the application for such order first
being served on said .Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Company or its attorneys.
Dated and filed March 24, 1939.
(Signed) Allen G. Thurman, Judge
31

PETITION
Comes now Sterling P. Harris, administrator of the above entitled estate, and respectfully
shows to the court :
That at the time of the death of Anna L.
Harris, there was pending in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, a proceeding under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act;
that said proceeding was abated by the death of
said Anna L. Harris.
Your petitioner further sho,vs to the court
that unless said proceeding is revived and reinstated, the entire estate of the said deceased is in
danger of being lost.
WHEREFORE, said petitioner prays for an
order of this court authorizing him to apply to the
United States District Court for an order reviving· and reinstating the said debtor relief proceeding.
.J. D. Skeen, E. J. Skeen,
Sterling P. Harris,
AttornPys fo1" Prfitioner
PetitionPr
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Not dated. Verified February 9, 1940. Filed
February 10, 1940.
34

ORDER .A.UTHORIZING ADMINISTRATOR
TO APPLY TO UNITED STATES COURT
This cause came on for hearing upon the lOth
day of February, 1940, on the petition of Sterling
P. Harris, administrator of the estate of Anna L.
Harris, deceased, praying- for the relief hereinafter provided; notice of said petition and hearing haYing been previously served upon Zion's
Savings Bank and Trust Company, a corporation;
the administrator being represented by his attorney, E. J. Skeen and said bank by its attorneys,
Thomas and Thomas; and the court having heard
said petition and the arguments of counsel and it
appearing and the court finds that there was
pending in the United States District Court, District of Utah in February, 1g.3s, a proceedings by
and on behalf of said Anna L. Harris as debtor
under and pursuant to Section 75, Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States for relief of debtors,
which upon the death of said deceased 'vas thereupon abated by said U:nited States Court in January, 1939; that on March 22, 1939, said administrator was appointed herein and thereafter said
bank commenced suit in this court against said
administrator to foreclose a mortgage upon farm
lands in Salt Lake County, Utah of said deceased,
joining others the'rein as defendants \\7ho claimed
liens thereon nnd obtained a judgment of fore-
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closure July 17, 1939, and a certificate of sale to
said lands at sheriff's sale August 15, 1939, for
$5,417.46, and the period of redemption from said
sale will expire by the laws of the State of Utah
on February 15, 1940, and no redemption has been
made and said proceedings in said United States
Court have not been revived,
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered
that said petition be granted and said administrator authorized to apply to said United Stat~s District Court for an order reviving and re-instating
the said debtor relief proceedings, or instituting
new proceedings in said court as advised.
And it is further ordered that said bank may
on appeal herefrom to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, stay the execution and enforcement
of this order by giving bond as provided by law
for such stay in the sum of $500.00 to the effect
that it will pay, in the event this order is sustained
on appeal, all damages which said administrator
may sustain by reason of the order having been
stayed pending appeal and the adn1inistrator not
having been allowed to make said application to
said United States Court.
Dated and filed February 13, 1940.
P. C. Evans, Judge
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Comes now the appellant and says there is
manifest error in the records, proceedings and
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order, given, made and entered the 13th day of
February, 1940, by the trial court herein, said
order being entitled ''Order Authorizing
, Administrator to Apply to United States Court" (Tr.
34), and appellant hereby assigns the following
errors upon which it relies for a reversal of said
order, to-wit:
1. The trial court erred in granting the Petition of respondent praying for the order aforesaid, which Petition is signed and verified by
appellant the 9th day of February, 1940. (Tr. 31).
2. The trial court erred in making and entering the order herein appealed from, to-wit,
''Order Authorizing Administrator to Apply to
United States Court" (Tr. 34).
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS & THOMAS,
Attorneys for Appellan.t
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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
ANNA L. HARRIS, Deceased.
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,
Appellant
vs.
STERLING P. HARRIS, administrator of the estate of Anna
L. Harris, deceased,
Respondent.

Case No.

r

6238

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
1.

STATEMENT

Appellant Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Company,
the mortgagee and holder of a sheriff's certificate of
sale on foreclosure, appeals from an order of the probate court granting the petition of respondent, Sterling
P. Harris, administrator, authorizing the administrator
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to make application to the United States District Court
of U~tah to ·revive a Debtor Relief proceedings (or institute new ones) under the Frazier- Lemke Act commenced
by his wife, Anna L. Harris, the mortgagor, but which
were abated by order of the federal court upon her death.
The Frazier-L~emke Act relates only to farmer debtors. It is Section 75 of the federal bankruptcy law as
amended in 19'35. 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 203. It was enacted in 1933 and is divided into two parts-subsections
"a" to "r" relating to compositions and extensions for
farmer debtors, and subsection ''s'' a 3-year moratorium
for the farmer, re-enacted in 1935 in somewhat less
rigorous terms than its predecessor which had been ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The entire Act,
Section 75, was carried forward into the general revision of the B'ankruptcy Law in 19'38 by what is commonly known as the Chandler Act.
Under the Frazier-L.emke Act a farmer insolvent in
the equity sense, files a petition in federal court under
said Section 75 seeking a composition or extension of
his debts anytime before the period of redemption on
foreclosure or execution expires-in fact, even afterward if sheriff's deed has not yet actually been issued,
a.nd the period of redemption is thereby, without more,
ipso facto extended indefinitely and all actions against
the farmer are stayed. Johnson's Commentary, Chandler Act, 11 U. S. C. A. (Sec. 201 to end) p. xxv.
The matter is referred to a conciliation commissioner
(conciliator) who calls a creditor's meeting. The farmer
proposes terms of c?mposition and extension. Acceptance in writing of the proposal by creditors of a ma-
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jority in number and amount, and confirmation by the
judge as an equitable and feasible method of liquidating
secured claims and calculated to serve the interests of
creditor and farmer alike, must be obtained or the proceedings fail of fruition. This is the first part of the
Act, subsections ''a'' to '' r '', and failing the approval
of both creditor and judge, the proceedings must be
dismissed-but, not if the farmer elects (and he always
does) to proceed under the last part of the Act, subsection '' s. ''
Subsection '' s'' takes up where subsections ''a'' to
'' r'' leave off. Under '' s '' the debtor, being unsuccessful with his proposal of composition and extension and
consequently confronted with a dismissal of his proceedings, ''amends'' his petition, asks to be adjudicated
a bankrupt and for retention of the property during a
3-year moratorium. The court orders the 3-year moratorium and installs the debtor securely in possession
meanwhile, subject only to payment of certain rent fixed
by appraisers and applicable first to taxes and then to
all creditor's pro rata. At the end of the 3-year moratorium, or sooner, the debtor may have the property
regardless and free of liens for its appraised value.
Johnson, Commentaries, Chandler Act. 11 U. S. C. A.
(Sec. 201 to end) p. xxv-xxvi.
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2. HISTORY OF FRAZIER-LEMKE ACT
We have already set out the subetance of the FrazierLemke Act, Section 75 of the bankruptcy law, 11 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 203. Now for its history.
A.

LEGISLATIVE

The Act was depression-born, being first enacted in
1933. It was declared to be only an emergency measure.
11 U. S. C. A. 203 (s)-6. It was to have continued for
five years up to March 3, 1938. l1 U. S. C. A. (Sec. 101
to end) Sec. 203. (c) p. 975. But ~till depression minded,
Congress in 1938 extended it two more years to March 4,
1940. 11 U. S. C. A .. (Section 201 to end) Section 203
(c) p. 8, and the Act, we are advised, was just recently
extended again four more years to March 4, 1944. The
last extension is too recent to afford the writer access
to its text or reference, and is therefore omitted here;
but the bill as reported by the House Committee (February 21, 19:40) would grant the farmer heaping measures
of congressional favor, in addition to extending the Act,
by offering rewards of two years further moratorium in
individual cases after the 3-year stay expires, if the
court. finds he has merited the same. Numerous other
broad and significant changes are included~ House of
Representatives Report, February 21, 19:40, No. 1658,
76th Congress, 3rd Session, Sec. "f" p. 11.
B.

BEFORE THE. CouRTS

Perhaps no Act of Congress ever received more and
varied discussion upon its constitutionality than did the
Frazier-Lemke law. The books abound with the deci-
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sions of the United States courts, both district courts
and Circuit Courts of Appeal, upholding it on the one
hand, and on the other condemning it upon considerations
of constitutional law including due process, equal protection of the laws, and the power of Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy. Only
confusion was the result. No good purpose would be
served in a citation of these authorities. They are now
only history, for the Act has finally reached the Supreme
Court and received its attention in three cases. which we
shall now note.
1.

THE_ RADFORD CASE

The first time the Frazier-Lemke Act was tested by
the Supreme Court (1935) subsection '' s' ', the second
portion of the Act which provides the 3-year moratorium
(then 5) was stricken down. Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S. 555. 79 L. Ed. 1593.
55 S. Ct. 854. 97 A. L. R. 1106.
The unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis held
the original subsection '' s'' invalid for depriving the
mortgagee of the right to( 1)
(2)
(3)
( 4)
(5)

retain his lien until paid ;
realize on. the security at a judicial public sale;
determine when a sale shall be had;
bid at the sale and thus protect his interest;
and,
control the property during the period of default (by a receiver, etc.) and thus receive the
rents;
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all of which were guaranteed by the applicable Kentucky
statute regarding mortgages, and that hence the mortgagee was deprived of due process and his property
taken without compensation contrary to the 5th Amendment.
And so, the original subsection '' s'' was invalidated
and the moratorium of the Frazier-Lemke Act was temporarily gone.
2.

WRIGHT

vs.

VINTON BRANCH

Soon, however, Congress re-enacted subsection '' s ''
to so pattern it as to avoid the interdiction of the ruling
in the Radford case, and with but slight changes it soon
reached the Supreme Court again, this time in 19·37 in
the Virginia case, Wright vs. Vinton Branch of the Moun..
tain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Virginia. 300 U. S. 440. 81
L. Ed. 736. 57 S. Ct. 556. 112 A. L. R. 1455.
Again the ruling was unanimous. Again the opinion
was by Mr. Justice Brandeis, but this time subsection
'' s '' was upheld as not unconstitutionally infringing upon the rights of mortgagees and not violative of the 5th
Amendment.
Moreover, in justifying its validity, the court discussed the Act's provision for closing the proceedings
at any time when it was apparent the debtor could not
refinance within three years, saying:
''(The Act) must be interpreted as meaning
that the court may terminate the stay if after a
reasonable time it becomes evident that there is
no reasonable hope that the debtor can rehabili, tate himself within the 3-year period ... And if
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the debtor is beyond all reasonable hope of financial rehabilitation, and the proeeeding·s under Section 75 cannot be expected to have any effect beyond postponing- inevitable liquidation, the proceedings u-ill be halted at the outset.'' (Parentheses and italics added.)
Thus, althoug-h the Act had been sustained, the rule
of Wright vs. Vinton Branch had become the law thereof throughout the land. Federal district courts and
Circuit Courts of Appeal followed its mandate as final,
and for failure to show a reasonable hope of rehabilitation, dismissed on every hand proceedings under the Act
and loosed the creditor to pursue his remedy by action
to foreclose.
Our own Circuit Court of Appeals (lOth) became
committeed to the rule as being the mandate of the Supreme Court. Sullivan vs. Tofflemoyer (C. C. A. lOth
1939) 104 F. (2d) 835. In that case, Judge Bratton cites
Wright vs. Vinton Branch as binding, and says:
"But the statute presupposes a reasonable
probability that the debtor will be able to liquidate his debts. Tha.t postulate is implicit in the
act. A debtor without present or potential equity
in his property with no reasonable chance of paying or refunding the liens on his property, and
who is beyond all reasonable hope of rehabilitation, is not entitled to invoke the statute and
thus merely defer inevitable liquidation. A pro, ceeding should be halted when it appears that
nothing beyond postponement of ineV'itable liquidation can be expected.'' (Italics added.)
Other Circuit Courts of Appeal fell into line. In re :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
Borgelt (7th) 79 F. (2d) 929; Massey vs. Farmers, etc.
Trust Company (4th) 94 F. (2d) 526; Cowherd vs.
Phoenix etc. Bank (8th) 99 F. (2d) 2·25, certiorari denied
59 S. Ct. 583 ; Bender vs. Federal Farm Mortgage Cor..
poration (8th) 99 F. (2d) 252; Donald vs. San Antonio
etc. Bank (5th) 100 F. ( 2d) 312 ; Wilson vs. Alliance Life
Insurance Company (5th) 102 F. (2d) 365.
But lawyers and others were de:Stined for surprise,
for the rule was not so firmly rooted by Wright vs. Vinton Branch as they had thought, and as we shall presently
see.
3. THE BARTELS CASE
For nearly three years after Wright vs. Vinton
B·ranch, supra, the Federal Courts had confidently followed its reasonable hope doctrine, which our own lOth
Circuit Court of Appeals had, as we have seen, deduced
from that decision to be the ''postulate implicit in the
Act," and had dismissed for lack of reasonable hope of
the debtor's rehabilitation. But in December, 1939, due
to a disagreement among the judges themselves in the
5th Circuit, the Act was again presented to the Supreme
Court, and this time the Court overruled Wright vs. Vinton Branch, and all of the deci~sions of the Circuit Courts
of Appeal and district courts came tumbling down. This
time the Court repudiated the reasonable hope rule and
held once a farmer suffers a refusal of his proposal for
composition and extension (subsections "a" to "r")
and then "amends" his petition and under ",s" asks and
is' adjudged to be a bankrupt, he becomes entitled to the
3-year moratorium as a matter of right and the court
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cannot dismiss, notwithstanding his utter impoverishment, and no matter that he will never be rehabilitated,
Wright vs. Vinton Branch to the contrary, notwithstanding.
This case is John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company vs. Bartels (D·ecember 4, 1939) 60 S. Ct. 221.
Chief Justice Hughes says in the unanimous opinion
there:
"The subsections of Section 75 \vhich regulate
the procedure in relation to the effort of a fannerdebtor to obtain a composition or extension contain no provision for a dismissal because of the
absence of a reasonable probability of the financial rehabilitation of the debtor.
And that "What is said upon this in Note 6
in Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U. S. 440, 46·2,
57 S. Ct. 556, 561, 81 L. Ed. 736, 112 A. L. R. 1455,
was not essential to the opinion in that case and
is not supported by the terms of the statute.''
This is now the law. The implications of the Bartels
case are definite. The reasonable hope doctrine is gone.
No matter how much a debtor owes or ho\v great his
debt exceeds his equity-and oftentimes it is actually
manyfold, as in the case of second or more remote mortgages; no matter that the creditor has the entire investment and the debtor none whatever left in the property;
no matter from indifference born of despair, or even
wilfully, he may have long since ceas-ed to look after
the property or to cultivate the land, repaint the building.s and preserve the farm; no matter he has suffered it
to become increasingly obsolescent; no matter how indulgent a forebearing creditor theretofore may have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
been-no matter all these, and the debtor with no interest left and the creditor with all that can be said to be
left in the property at a time when he finally should be
entitled by State law to take over and attempt to salvage some part of his losses, still the debtor by now
virtually a stranger to any interest in the property,
takes over and prevents the creditor, to whom it should
rightfully belong, from entering and restoring the property while dilapidation, depreciation and obsolesence
continue their merciless toll three years longer; perhaps
by the new Act for five. But, holds the Supreme Court,
the mortgagee is not deprived of due process.
The creditor himself may, by the very operation of
the Act, also be rendered impoverished and his resources
along with what is left with the debtor's wiped out.
The creditor will sometimes be an individual, other times,
a life insurance company guardian of the savings: of
millions of small policyholders, including farmers, or it
may even be a trust or foundation for the maintaining
of a unive:vsity, hospital or other charity. But it also is
subject if the debtor avails himself of the stay.
The Act applies not only in the case of mortgages·,
but also to equities of every sort, including contracts
for purchase, conditional sales, and even the right of
redemption on foreclosure although the statutory period
has expired, i£ the sheriff's deed has not yet been issued.
Subsection "n."
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3. FURTHER STATEMENT
We have discussed the Frazier-Lemke Act at length
so the court may have before. it the benefit of its origin
and history and its present status and effect in approaching this appeal.
We have seen that the Supreme Court first denounced, but later sustained, the Act, establishing for ~
time the reasonable hope rule, but totally capitulated
to its appeal finally in December, 1939, and that now,
once a debtor is adjudicated under '' s, '' no creditor may
pry him away from the refuge of its 3-year moratorium
{now possibly 5) for all his utter impoverishment and
stark inability to rehabilitate.
The administrator here asks leave of the probate
court to seek the benefits of Section 75 in the bankruptcy
court. His wife, Anna L. Harris, had commenced such
a proceeding and it was pending in the federal court as
early as February, 1938. But she died within a year,
whereupon, in January, 1939, the proceed.ings were
abated by order of that court. (Abs. 3, Tr. 34.)
Two months later, March 22, 1939, the probate court
appointed respondent as her administrator herein. (Abs.
3, Tr. 34.) But conceding appellant bank, then simply
a mortgage holder, the right to be heard, the court simultaneously ordered notice to the bank in the event the
administrator should ask for authority to seek a revivor
of the abated bankruptcy proceedings. (Abs. 1-2, Tr. 30.)
The bank then proceeded to foreclose. Judgment
of foreclosure was entered July 17, 19·39. A sheriff's sale
was had and the certificate of sale issued to the bank
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August 15, 1939, for $5417.46, and the bank was awaiting
the sheriff's deed which was to be· due on February 15,
1940. ( Abs. 3-4, Tr. 34.)
But five days (February 10) before the redemption
period was up and the sheriff's deed was due, the administrator petitioned the probate court for leave to apply
in the federal court for a revivor of thH bankruptcy
proceedings. (Abs. 2, Tr. 31.) This petition was heard
on that day, was taken under advisement, and was
granted by an order of February 13. The order, however,
provides that it may be stayed pending appeal by the
bank's giving supersedeas bond which it did immediately
the same day. (Abs. 3-4, Tr. 34.) (Tr. 38).
It is from this order that the bank appeals, assigning error in the granting of the petition and entry of the
~rder, (Ahs. 5), the administrator lacking authority, and
the probate court likewise being powerless under the
probate code to permit him, to subject the estate to the
processes of the Frazier-Lemke Act as we shall no'Y' see.
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THE AD!MINISTRATOR AND THE PROBATE
COURT .A.RE POWERLESS UNDER THE PROBATE
CODE TO SUBMIT THE ESTATE TO THE
BANJ(RUPTCY COURT

4.

The administrator applied, as we have seen, to the
probate court for authority to g-o to the federal court.
This he did, because such application is a pre-requisite
under the Frazier-Lemke Act.
True it is that subsection '' r'' includes the administrator of a deceased farmer within its definition of the
term ''fanner. ''
'' ( r) For the purposes of this section . . .
the term 'farmer' ... includes the personal representative of a deceased farmer.''
But consistent with orderly procedure and cognizant of the jurisdiction of a probate court over its
own administrator and pursuant to its rule making powers bestowed by Section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act (11
U. S. C. A., Sec. 53), the Supreme Court on January 16,
1939, promulgated its General Order 50(9) requiring an
administrator who would seek the benefit of the FrazierLemke Act to first obtain the authority of the probate
court which created him and to exhibit in his petition
to the federal court his appointment and authorization,
thus:
"(9) The personal representative of a deceased farmer who desires in his representative
capacity to effect, under section 75, a composition
or extension of the debts of the estate, shall attach
. to his petition, in lieu of schedules, the following
. papers, certified as correct by the court which
appointed him (hereinafter referred to as the
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probate court): (a) a copy of the order of his
appointment, (b) a copy of an order of the probate court authorizing him to file the petition,"
... etc. General Order 50(9). 11 U. S. C. A. (Sec.
53-100), 19·39 Pocket Part, p. 38.
Now the source of an administrator's existence and
power, and that of his creator the probate court as well,
is exclusively the statute, viz, the Probate Code.
Probate proceeding.s are statutory.
''Proceedings for the administration of estates of decedents are purely statutory. In fact,
the whole matter of the disposition of estates of
decedents is within the legislative control." (Italics added) 1 Bancroft's Probate Practice 76.
The probate court's jurisdiction is exclusive.
''Jurisdiction of the probate courts to administer upon the estate of decedents is prhnary
and exclusive. It w1ould be an anomaly i.n· jurisprudence if a court vested with full jurisdiction
in ma.tters of probate could be controlled in the
exercise of that jurisdiction by a co-10'rdinate court
or even by the samB court sitting as a court of
general jurisdio,tion." 1 Bancroft's Probate Practice 62. (Italics added.)
And since probate proceedings are exclusively statutory, a statutory grant of specific powers constitutes by
implication a limitation on those powers of the probate
court.
''Since probate pr~ceedings are everywhere
recognized as being statutory in their nature, the
effect of a specific enumeration of powers of a
court exercising probate jurisdiction is to limit
such powers by implication to those expressly
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conferred.'' (Italics added.) 1 Bancroft's Probate Practice 39. ''
In fact this court has already recognized probate
proceeding·s to be strictly statutory. In re: Cloward's
Estate. ---- U. ----· 82 P. (2d) 336. There, this court said
upon the subject:
''The law governing wills and the administration of estates of deceased persons is stat·utory.
The court, sitting in probate, derives its power
franz the statutes and has only such pow·ers as are
granted by statu.te or reasonably implied or reasonably necessary and proper to effectuate the
powers which are given." (Italics added.)
Thus an administrator, even the probate court itself
his creator, has those and only those powers which the
statute provides or which are reasonably necessary to
effect those granted. He has no further powers.
Since the administrator possesses only those powers which the statute bestows, it is clear he cannot subject the estate to the jurisdiction of another forum unless
the statute says so. And since the powers of the probate court are likewise limited it, too, is helpless to authorize the administrator to do so unless the statute
permits.
It results, then, that without a grant, explicit or
implied in the Probate Code, the administrator may not
transfer, and the probate court is powerless to surrender,
the administration of a deceased's affairs to a bankruptcy court.
It is of no consequence that Section 75 includes the
farmer's administrator and that the General Order permits him to apply for bankruptcy if the probate court
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consents, for probate proceedings exist, as we have seen,
solely by virtue of State sta~ute, and the agencies employed by the statute in effecting administration and
disposition of estates are its creatures, the administrator and the probate court, both controlled exclusively
by the limitations it provides.
Clearly subsection "r" and General Order 50(9)
were not designed to invade a State Probate Code. Such
an attempt would have been idle for State probate statutes are the source and limit of all probate proceedings
and a federal court, being a court of limited, and not
general jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction of probate proceeding.s.
"A proceedings for the probate of a will is
not a suit of a civil nature at law or in equity
within the jurisdiction vested by the Judiciary
Acts upon the federal courts, and they .have no
jurisdiction over such proceedings and of distribution of estates because (1) the subject is statu-tory, and (2) they are in the nature of proceedings in rem, and proceedings in rem are not a
part of general equity jurisdiction of any court.
''The federal courts cannot distribute generally because the state courts must first establish
the succession. In truth they have no probate
pow·ers or authority." (Italics added.) 2· Hughes
Federal Practice 216, 217.
The inclusion of the administrator within the tenn
"farmer" and the General Order requiring him to obtain the probate court's authority are simply gestures
which beckon him to the bankruptcy court, no more. But
before he may accept their invitation he must have the
consent of the ·probate court, and both he and that court
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must be authorized by the statute.
Does the Probate Code of Utah contain such authority! Obviously not.
The Utah Probate Code was enacted long prior to
the Frazier-Lemke Act and before the latter was ever
conceived. Our own legislature, not to mention Congress
itself, had never heard of it and therefore in enacting
our Probate Code the legislature could by no power of
divination have contemplated it. Consequently, the Probate Code nowhere mentions the Frazier-Lemke Act,
Section 75, nor the subject of bankruptcy at all. Since
it is nowhere mentioned it follows that nowhere is it provided therein that an administrator may resort to Section 75. The express provisions of the Code are exclusively in regard to the administration of a decedent's
property· in a. probate court and its distribution to the
heirs according to its proper devolution.
Distribution with dispatch is the Code's theme
throughout. The representative must "immediately"
give notice to creditors. Revised Statutes 1933, 102-9-1.
He must file an inventory and appraisement in three
months, 102-7-1; is required to account in 30 days after
notice to creditors and also six months after his appointment, 102-11-32; pay for the funeral and last sickness
as soon as he is in funds, 102-9-21, and may be required
to distribute the property when the time for presenting
of claims has expired, 102-12-4.
To the end that administration be closed without
delay, creditors must present claims in at least four
months or they are barred forever, 102-9-4, and must
sue on their rejected claims within three months, 102-9-9.
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(Yet under the Frazier-Lemke Act, however, they cannot
maintain any suit at all against the farmer, so while the
three years' moratorium slowly runs, the three months'
limitation against the creditors is quickly over. In fact,
subsection '' o '' enjoins all ''proceedings'' against the
f~irmer in any court. Thus, query if the creditor may
even present his claim after the administrator gets into
the federal court.)
The spirit of the Probate Code is administration
and final distribution for the sake of heirs and creditors
with dispatch. That of Section 75 is altogether contrary,
being delay and eventual avoidance of any distribution.
This court has held that the administrator and the
probate court are endowed with only those implied powers reasonably necessary to effect the powers expressed.
In re: Cloward, supra. And since nowhere in the Code
is there any power expressed which authorizes an administrator to resort to the Frazier-Leffike Act or permits the probate court to authorize him to do so; and,
since the only implied' powers are those incident to the
administration and distribution of estates in the: probate
court and not in a federal court or court of bankruptcy,
(neither of w~ich has jurisdiction in probate), it results
that neither the administrator nor the probate court
has any power express or imp,lied to carry the estate and
its administration over into the federal court and thus
abandon it and the jurisdiction of the probate court to a
court of bankruptcy from which it may not be reclaimed.
The court therefore erred in entering its order authorizing the administrator to do so herein and the same
must be reversed.
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5. THE ADMINISTRATOR AND rrHE PROBATE
COURT ...\RE POWERLESS TO SUBMIT THE REAL
PROPERTY OF THE ESTAT·E TO THE
BANKRUPTCY COURT
But in any event the administrator may not submit
the real property of an estate to a proceedings under
the Frazier-Lemke Act. It has been so held where the
question has arisen. We have found only two instances
where the question was decided. Both times it was
against the administrator.
The case of in re: Reynolds, 21 F. Supp. 369, involved
the Probate Code of Oklahoma and was decided by a
federal district court ther.e in 19'37. The facts are strikingly similar to those at bar. Three months after filing
his petition under Section 75 (here 1 year) the debtor
died and the proceedings were dismissed.
One month later (here, two) the administrator was
appointed.
Eleven months thereafter (same as here) the administrator petitioned the federal court to revive the
proceedings and was met with a motion to dismiss the
entire cause on the grounds that title· to the real property
vested immediately in the heirs under the Oklahoma law.
The section in question ( 0. S. 1931, Sec. 1615) identical
with our own Section 101-4-2 is as follows:
''The property, both real and personal, of
one who dies without disposing of it by will passes
to the heirs of the intestate, subject to the control
of the court, and to the possession of any administrator appointed by the court for the purposes
of administration.''
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The federal court, bound as it was thereby, looked
to the state court decisions on the subject of descent
and said that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had commented on this section several times and quoted from the
state court in Seal vs. Banes, 168 Okl. 550; 35 P. (2d)

704:
"Upon a person dying intestate, the heirs
of such person become immediately vested with
the estate, and the estate is indefeasible, subject
to the control of the county court and the possession of the management by the administrator,
and it is his duty simply to preserve the estate
until distribution to the heirs, unless, and in the
manner provided by statute, the necessity iShould
arise for a sale."
The court also quotes from another state court
decision, in re: Hibdons Estate, 102 Okl. 145; 228 P. 154:
"Under section 11300, C. L. 1921, all property, both real and personal, of all persons who die
intestate· passes to the heirs of such intestate,
subject to the control of the county court and
subject to administration.''
The court continues saying:
''The question of whether or not an administrator can maintain an action in bankruptcy
under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act has not
been passed upon by the higher courts, but in an
opinion involving the same substantial provisions
of the statute of Illinois as are contained in the
Oklahoma statutes, with reference to the powers
of executors and administrators, the district court
for the Eastern district of Illinois, in the case of
in re: Buxton, 14 F. Supp. 616 has held, quoting
from the sixth syllabus: Deceased farmer's ad-
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~

ministrator, appointed under Illinois law, could
not be adjudicated a bankrupt under statute, notwithstanding· statute includes personal repre>sentative of deceased farmer within designation of
'farmer' in view of limited authority of administrator over decedent's real estate under Illinois
law and his consequent inability to subject decedent's real estate to provisions of statute. (11
U. S. C. A. 203 "r").
''The Illinois statute is so similar to the Oklahoma statute that the court cann'ot conceive of a
different conclusion under the circumstances of
this case than that reached by Judge Wham in
the Illinois case. It is the judgment of the court
that the administrator cannot maintain this action. '' In re: Reynolds, 21 F. Supp. 369 (D. C.
Okl.)
Thus, under statutory provisions identical with those
of our own Probate Code regarding descents of real
property the court held the administrator was without
authority to maintain the Frazier-Lemke proceedings
and they were dismissed.
The Illinois federal case, Buxton's Estate, 14 F.
Supp. 616, involved a petition to the federal court under
Section 75 made in the first instance by the administrator and "amended" later in an attempt to bring
him within subsection "s ".
The creditors moved a dismissal. The grounds of
the motion were that under the Illinois Probate Code
administrators are ''without power to enter into bankruptcy under Section 75, even though that section has
opened the doors to representatives of deceased
persons."
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The court asks :
''May an administrator of a deceased farmer
appointed under the laws of Illinois be lawfully
adjudicated a bankrupt under said subsection (s)
in view of the fact that said subsection opens the
door of bankruptcy thereunder to 'any farmer'
and that subsection ( r) of said Section 75 . . .
includes the personal representative of a deceased
farmer''~ In re : Buxton, supra.
It answers thus:

''My conclusion is that while the term 'personal representative' as used in subs.ection (r) of
Section 75 may be broad enough to include all
executor.s and administrators of the estates of
deceased farmers, it does not follow that all executors and administrators may lawfully enter into
bankruptcy.'' in re: Buxton, supra.
And the court continue;s :
''It was. not the purpose of Congress through
this legislation to attempt to add to or remove
limits from the power and authority conferred by
a state statute upon a personal representative
cr~ated solely by virtue of such statute through
an order of court authorized thereon as is an
admini~trator of an estate of a deceased person
under the laws of Illinois. Rather it would seem
that the sole purpose of Congress was to make
Sections 74 and 75 of the Bankruptcy Act available to the personal representatives of deceased
farmers, who . by statute, will or other creating
means are given sufficiently broad powers to
tak~ advantage, depending on the extent of such
power' of all or' any part of the provisions of said
sections.'' In re : Buxton, supra.
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As to the administrator's power under the Illinois
law it is said:
'' . .\.n administrator of an estate of a deceased
person in Illinois is appointed under statutes
giving him strictly limited power. Being a creature of statute, he must derive his entire authority
thereunder.
''An administrator takes no title to real estate, either legal or equitable, but it descends to
and vests in the heirs at once upon the death of
the ancestor.'' In re : Buxton, supra.
Then coming to the administrator and the FrazierLemke Act, the court concludes :
''Accepting the foregoing as an accurate
statement of the very lin1ited powers of an administrator under the laws of Illinois, it is difficult to see how he could, within the limitations of
those powers, lawfully take advantage of said subsection ( s) insofar as it applies to real estate.
For him to do so would require him to take and
for a period of three years retain possession of
the real estate which on the death of his decedent
vested in the heirs at law.'' In re: Buxton, supra.
The Illinois federal court then finally concluded that
the administrator with his limited power and authority
over the real estate cannot subject it to the provisions
of Section 75 and granted the motion to dismiss.
And so by the only decisions available to our knowledge, it is unanimously considered that the administrator is without power to subject the real property of an
estate to Section 75 and the order herein must be
reversed.
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THE ADMINISTRATOR'S PETITION FAILS TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
· Aside from the question of the power of the. administrator and probate court under our Code to subject the
property, particularly real estate as here, to the bankruptcy court which is clearly lacking, the administrator's
petition was wholly insufficient. (Abs. 2, Tr. 31.) The
petition follows:
PETITION
''Comes now Sterling P. Harris, administrator of the above entitled estate, and respectfully
shows to the court :
''That at the time of the death of Anna L.
Harris, there was pending in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, a proceeding under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act;
that said proceeding was abated by the death of
said Anna L. Harris.
"Your petitioner further shows to the court
that unless said proceeding is revived and reinstated, the entir~ estate of the said deceased is in
danger of being lost.
''WHERIEFORE, said petitioner prays for an
order of this court authorizing him to apply to the
United States District Court for an order reviving and reinstating the said debtor relief proceeding.''
As ·the reader will see, the petition wholly ·fails to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Only
two facts, no more, are stated. These are simply:
(1) That when Mrs. Harris died the FrazierLemke proceedings were pending in the federal
court; and,
(2) that they were then abated.
The only remaining allegation is not one of fact
but is purely a oon.clusion :
6.
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''That unless said proceedings are revived
and reinstated, the entire estate of the said deceased is in danger of being lost.''
The p·etition is barren of any facts showing a reason for the court to g·rant it. No explanation of how the
estate, the heirs and creditors and others concerned
would benefit by the bankruptcy proceedings being revived was made therein. No facts were exhibited to
show the bankruptcy court could or would better administer the estate th~n the probate court and that therefore the latter should abdicate and should surrender
its jurisdiction to the federal court, or explaining in any
way why the probate court should abandon its solemn
duty and jurisdiction specially enjoined upon it by statute
to administer to a conclusion the estate in its own court
to the exclusion of all others.
Probate courts are quite competent to administer
the affairs of deceased debtors. In fact, they themselves have authority to authorize compositions. by administrators of debtors, which the administrator must
admit, would have to be the first objective he would seek
in the bankruptcy court under the first part of Section
75, "a" to "r".
The Probate Code specifically authorizes compositions for harrassed debtors. It reads:
"102-11-12. Whenever a debtor of the decedent is unable to pay all his debts, the executor or administrator, with the approval of the
court or judge, may compound with hin1 and give
a discharge upon receiving a fair and just dividend of his effects. A compromise may also be
authorized when it appears to be just and for the
best interests of the estate.''
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The petition does not state that the administrator
is unable to effect a composition or extension in the probate court where he belongs, or that he will be able to
effect one at all in the bankruptcy court; or that if he
could do so in the state court, that he could do better in
the federal court. For all that appears he could have
obtained a composition in the probate court as effectively
and advantageously as any he could hope for in the federal court.
Nor is his conclusion ''that the estate is in danger
of being lost'' of any aid in his attempting to state a
cause of action for'' conclusions of law are not to be considered in
determining whether a pleading states a cause of
action." Gunnison Irr. Co. vs. Peterson 74 U.
460. 280 P. 715. And see to same effect 1 Bancroft's Code Pl. 90. Id. 10 Yr. Supp. 26.
And 1ince the petition does not state a cause of
action it can be challenged at any time and place, even
on appeal, and the failure to demur is inconsequential.
1 Bancroft's Code Pl. 157. Id. 10 Yr. Supp. 396. 49 C. J.
820. Id. 839. For example, it is said:
"1216. An objection that the declaration,
petition, or complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action may be
raised at any time, and at any stage of the proceedings; it may be raised after answer, after the
time to demur or answer has passed, at the trial,
before verdict or judgment, after judgment, or
even for the first time on appeal.'' 49 C. J. 820.
Since the petition failed to ·state a cause of action,
the court erred in entering its order thereon and the
same must be reversed.
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7. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING THE ADMINISTRATOR'S
PETITION
We have seen that under the Probate Code from
which they derive their powers the administrator and
the probate court are powerless to enter into bankruptcy
and that regardless of their lack of power the petition
failed to state a cause of action.
But had they such power and had the petition been
sufficient, granting the administrator the authority he
sought would not be a matter of right but would involve
the exercise of the sound discretion of the court.
Certainly the court in such cases would have the duty
to apprais-e the situation and determine two things:
(1) Whether any benefit was likely to result to the
estate, the heirs and creditors by its allowance, and, if so,
(2) whether such benefits were calculated to exceed those
available in the probate court. If no benefit were to
accrue, obviously the petition should be denied. And
although certain benefits may appear likely, still the
court should not grant the petition unless the benefits
are fairly calculated to exceed those available in the
probate court. For certainly there would be no proper
reason in a probate court's resigning in favor of another
unless it were assured such other would do a better job
than it. No such assurance was made to appear by this
petition.
Now the deceased had journeyed in the bankruptcy
court for one year without any benefit before she died.
Her administrator also had had charge of the estate with-
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in the probate court for another year thereafter. Altogether they had spent two year.s in the two courts before
the petition was filed herein. Both had been unable to pay
the debts of the estate. Though both courts had power
to authorize a composition with creditors, they had failed
to obtain one in either.

After two years of inaction and only five days
before· ~sheriff's ·deed, the administrator set out to effect
a composition. He offered no excuse for this· previous
inaction. Neither did he suggest how a composition
might be accomplished. Not even did he say it would be
possible. Although, if it could be arranged, the probate
court had power to approve it, he avoided that court in
this regard. The reason is obvious. He did not seek a
composition at all. What he sought was delay. More
delay besides the two years already spent. He wanted
three more years, which would make five in all (perhaps
now seven) to use and withhold the property from the
heirs and from the creditor who had invested the savings of its depositors in this farm, and to whom it rightfully should belong. No solution was offered. Nothing
but delay and more delay would be the result. The situation was hopeless. But notwithstanding, the lower
court granted the petition. In view of all of the circumstances -it, in so doing, did not exercise a sound discretion, but its discretion was abused, and its order therefore was erroneous and should be reversed.
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8.

CONCLUSION

Whether an administrator should be empowered to
resort to bankruptcy is a question exclusively for the
legislature of this State. To date it has not ordained that
he may, although it has already met and adjourned four
times 'vhile the Act has been in force. Each time it has
failed to give its authority. Until it does, no court may
assume to do so for it.
It is submitted by appellant:
1. That the authority of the administrator and the
probate court are limited by the Probate Code to the
powers therein contained and the right to enter into
bankruptcy is not conferred and the administrator and
court are therefore powerless to do so.
2. That since the real property of an intestate instantly devolves upon his heirs, the administrator's
limited powers thereover are not sufficient to allow him
to resort to the Frazier-Lemke Act and deprive the
heirs and creditors of an administration and distribution by a probate court for 3 years-now perhaps 5.
3. That the administrator's petition fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
4. That regardless of the foregoing, the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the petition, the de . .
ceased and administrator having already spent 2 years
in the bankruptcy and probate courts without avail, the
latter now seeking a further moratorium of 3 more,
aggregating 5 years in all, with the possibility of extending it another 2 years for a total of 7 if the bill as reported by the House Committee becomes law.
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5. The order authorizing the administrator to apply
to the United States Court is erroneous, and the trial
court· exceeded its powers thereby and the· same should
be reversed and set aside with costs to appellant.
Respectfully,

T'HOMAS & THOMAS,

Attorneys for Appellant
March 23, 1940
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